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GUS VAN HARTEN* 
 
 
The article examines five common justifications for the investment treaty system in order to highlight aspects of 
the system that give cause for concern. First, it examines whether investment treaties are a means to encourage 
foreign direct investment and concludes that this expectation is contradicted by common provisions in 
investment treaties and is unsupported by the preponderance of empirical evidence. If this justification was a 
factor in the decisions of states to conclude investment treaties – or of international organizations to promote 
them – then these decisions appear to have been based on incomplete knowledge and analysis of the 
anticipated benefits. Second, the article examines the claim that investment treaties respond to the bias and 
unreliability of domestic courts and criticizes investment treaties in this respect for being both under-inclusive 
(by extending access to international adjudication to a narrow class of private actors only) and over-inclusive 
(by failing to account for situations where domestic courts offer justice to a foreign investor). Third, the paper 
examines the claim that investment treaty arbitration advances the rule of law in the resolution of investor-
state disputes and questions this claim after considering how investment treaty arbitration fails to incorporate 
key institutional safeguards of judicial independence that are present in other adjudicative systems that resolve 
public law claims. Fourth, the paper examines the argument that investment treaties affirm the sovereignty 
and bargaining strategies of states and outlines tentative evidence that governments did not test carefully the 
anticipated benefits of the treaties, did not appreciate fully the risks of investor-state arbitration, and did not 
carry out sophisticated cost-benefit analyses prior to committing themselves to the investment treaty system. 
Finally, the paper examines the justification that investment treaties were endorsed by the democratic processes 
of states and draws attention both to the role of arbitrators in giving meaning to the treaties and to certain 
aspects of investment treaties that appear to undermine democratic choice. Based on this analysis, it is 
recommended that governments exercise greater care when considering entry into the system or, more likely, the 
maintenance or renewal of existing treaties, and that governments consider options for reform. 
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The treaty-based investment regime incorporates one of the most powerful systems of 
international adjudication in modern history. This system re-allocates powers from states to 
multinational companies and from domestic courts to a private arbitration industry based in 
Washington, New York, London, Paris, The Hague, and Stockholm.1 The system remains a 
recent development in international adjudication, having emerged as a significant decision-
making process only in the mid-1990s. It is not surprising that there is apprehension about 
the system and, in turn, that this has generated pressure for reform. The initial source of 
such pressure in the 1990s was civil society, but a more recent source is the governments of 
countries against which claims have been brought by investors. For the most part, these are 
developing or transition countries. It seems likely that new ideas and approaches to the 
resolution of investment disputes will come from these states.2 
 In this article I canvass a number of issues that arise in debates about the investment 
regime. The aim is to identify elements of investment treaties and investment arbitration that 
give cause for concern. The discussion is presented as a series of responses to five 
justifications offered for the system in academic, trade literature or public commentary.3 The 
main sources for this discussion are the texts of investment treaties, awards of arbitration 
tribunals, and academic literature. The article does not aspire to a comprehensive or 
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1 I speak in particular of the roles played in international arbitration by large law firms in these 
centres; and, more specifically, of the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and its International Court of Arbitration, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration (PCA), and the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC). 
2 L.S. Poulsen, Are South-South BITs any Different? A Logistic Regression Analysis of Two Substantive BIT 
Provisions, Paper for the American Society of International Law Biennial Conference (November 
2008); K. Miles, Imperialism, Eurocentrism and International Investment Law: Whereto From Here for Asia?, 
Paper for the Second Biennial General Conference of the Asian Society of International Law (August 
2008) (hereinafter Miles). 
3 See, for example, the work of Charles N. Brower, Jan Paulsson, Thomas Wälde, Daniel M. Price, 
Todd Weiler, Ian A. Laird, Charles H. Brower II, Susan D. Franck, and Stephan Schill. Throughout 
the paper, I refer periodically to exemplary publications of these and other authors on specific 
justifications for the system; in this respect, J. PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Cambridge University Press 2005), at ch. 9 (hereinafter PAULSSON) provides a useful summary 
of various justifications for the system and is referred to on a number of issues below. Promotional 
material is also common in informational publications produced by the law firms that work in the 
field; e.g. S. Noury & C. Richard (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP), International Arbitration in 
Latin America: Overview and Recent Developments, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2009, at 282 (Global Legal Group 2009) (“Latin American states for 
years rejected arbitration due to the suspicion that it granted greater rights to foreign investors.... 
Over the last 30 years, great advances have been made towards the abandonment of this isolationist 
policy.... However, the ghost of Dr. Calvo still lingers on in the form of pockets of resistance to 
arbitration both within the judiciary... and the government.”). 
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systematic empirical review nor does it claim to supply any definitive answers to the 
questions it raises. Rather, the aim is to elaborate some concerns about the system and, in 





II. PRESSURE FOR REFORM 
 
Expectations of reform of the investment regime stem from recent events. First, from the 
late 1990s, there was an awakening of sorts in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico on the sheer 
significance of the powers allocated to foreign investors and to arbitrators under NAFTA 
Chapter 11.5 This led to modest but important reforms of NAFTA investment arbitration, 
including steps to make it more open and to limit the interpretive discretion of arbitrators.6 
In addition, the U.S. and Canada subsequently revisited their policies on investment treaties 
in an attempt to clarify loose language on the concepts of expropriation and “fair and 
equitable” treatment and to expand exceptions for financial measures, for example.7 This 
experience suggested that the NAFTA states did not originally anticipate the full implications 
of NAFTA Chapter 11. A similar suggestion arose more recently when officials from two 
major developing states – Pakistan and South Africa – reported that their governments did 
not appreciate the risks of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) when they were concluded in 
the 1990s and that such treaties must receive closer scrutiny.8 
                                                 
4 G. Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, SIEL Working Paper No. 22/08 (June 
2008), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1153424; G. VAN HARTEN, 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (Oxford University Press 2007), at ch. 7 
(hereinafter VAN HARTEN-INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION). 
5 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of 
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, December 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, at ch. 11 (hereinafter NAFTA). Awareness of these issues also developed via the 
debate in the mid-1990s over the OECD’s proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), a 
project that was abandoned after France’s withdrawal from the negotiations, the expression of 
reservations by various governments, and widespread opposition from civil society organizations in 
North and South. C. Lalumière and J. P. Landau, Report on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI), Interim Report to the Government of France (September 1998); E. Smythe, Domestic and 
International Sources of Regime Change: Canada and the Negotiation of the OECD Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, St. 
John’s, Nfld. (8 June, 1997), at 9-10; A. Walter, NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51, 58-60 (2001). 
6 Free Trade Commission (NAFTA), Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (30 
July, 2001), 13(6) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 139, available at: www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-
nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp. 
7 A. Newcombe, Canada’s New Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, 30(14) CANADIAN 
COUNCIL ON INT’L L. BULL. (2004), available at: www.ccil-
ccdi.ca/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=89&Itemid=112; See also the “May 10th” 
U.S. Administration-Congressional Agreement on Trade Policy, reproduced in the letter of May 10, 
2007 from the Chairs of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Ways & Means and 
Subcommittee on Trade to the U.S. Trade Representative, available at: 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/Media/pdf/110/05%2014%2007/05%2014%2007.pdf. 
8 Republic of South Africa, infra note 55, 95. 
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
 4
 More recently, a tentative trend toward more fundamental reform has emerged in 
Latin America.9 In 2007, Bolivia withdrew from the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Ecuador excluded disputes over natural resources from its 
consent to the ICSID Convention.10 In July 2009, Ecuador went further and denounced the 
ICSID Convention outright.11 Venezuela withdrew from its BIT with the Netherlands 
(whose BITs have been used by forum-shopping investors to bring claims against the 
opposite state party via holding companies in the Netherlands).12 Various states have also 
announced plans to establish an arbitration forum within the Union of South American 
Countries (UNASUR) as an alternative to ICSID.13 Governments have also pushed foreign 
investors to renegotiate investment contracts, especially in the resource sector, and have 
reportedly modified their approach to investment contracts so as to require foreign investors 
to waive their right to pursue investment treaty arbitration in the event of a dispute arising 
from the contract.14 
 Perhaps most importantly, in 2008, Ecuador terminated eight BITs which were 
deemed to be unsuccessful in stimulating new investment15 and, in October 2009, President 
Rafael Correa reportedly proposed to the country’s Congress that Ecuador should withdraw 
from 13 additional BITs dating from the 1990s.16 These include Ecuador’s BITs with six 
conventional capital-exporters in Europe and North America (U.S., U.K., Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, and Canada)17 as well as China. Ecuador’s stance apparently reflects a wider 
policy choice to accept foreign investment from China as an alternative to Western capital. It 
remains to be seen whether China is prepared to make such investment without requiring 
the treaty-based protections sought and designed by the West and whether China will rely on 
other means to avoid or manage political risks. 
                                                 
9 I.A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, Research paper (2009), available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/ignacio_vincentelli/1. 
10 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 18 March, 
1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (hereinafter ICSID Convention). L.E. Peterson, Ecuador becomes second state to exit 
ICSID system; IAReporter review finds that approximately two-thirds of treaty claims against Ecuador have been 
brought to ICSID, 2(12) INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (17 July, 2009), available at: www.iareporter.com. 
11 F. Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador prepares for life after ICSID, while debate continues over effect of its exit from the 
Centre, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (September 2009) at 3. 
12 L.E. Peterson, Venezuela surprises the Netherlands with termination notice for BIT; treaty has been used by 
many investors to “route” investments into Venezuela, 1(1) INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (16 May, 2008), available 
at: www.iareporter.com. 
13 F. Cabrera Diaz, South American alternative to ICSID in the works as governments create an energy treaty, 
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (6 August, 2008). 
14 A. Romanetti, Preventing the Abuse of Multiple and Concurrent Arbitration Proceedings: Waiver Clauses, 
Draft paper (2009)  
15 These steps by Ecuador are especially important because they remove the state’s underlying 
consents to the compulsory arbitration of investor claims and because they do so in relation to 
treaties that apply to large amounts of capital flows or potential capital flows into Ecuador. In doing 
so, they return Ecuador to the legal position that it occupied before 1995 when the first of its BITs 
with a major capital-exporter (the UK) was concluded; L.E. Peterson, Ecuadorian President reportedly 
asks Congress to terminate 13 BITs; move comes on heels of earlier termination of multiple BITs, 2(17) 
INVESTMENT ARB. REP. (30 October, 2009). 
16 UNCTAD, Country-specific list of BITs, available at: 
www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2344&lang=1 (hereinafter UNCTAD List). 
17 Major Capital-Exporters, infra note 22. 
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
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 It should be stressed that, even in Latin America, this push back against the system, 
while very significant, does not necessarily reflect a broad movement in the region (given the 
ongoing adherence of other countries, especially Argentina, to their treaties and to ICSID). 
Even so, these recent developments reflect widespread doubts about the system. The 
arbitration mechanism, especially, has gained notoriety as more investors have brought 
aggressive claims against governments in matters of general public policy, as arbitrators have 
adopted expansive readings of their own jurisdiction and of substantive standards under the 
treaties,18 and as some very large awards have been issued against states.19 
 The timing of recent reforms is also significant. Some argue that it reflects a wider 
malaise of the corporate neoliberal model – based on the upward transfer of wealth, 
constraint of government, and liberalisation of markets20 – that has been associated with 
Anglo-American and Bretton Woods politics since the 1980s.21 Investment treaty arbitration 
is an important legal and institutional piece of the neoliberal puzzle because it imposes 
exceptionally powerful legal and economic constraints on governments and, by extension, on 
democratic choice, in order to protect from regulation the assets of multinational firms. It is 
unlikely that the break-out period of BITs in the late 1980s and early 1990s coinciding with 
the heyday of the Washington Consensus was a coincidence. This was a period in which 
large numbers of treaties were concluded by disparate countries with the cumulative effect of 
expanding the system well beyond its origins in the treaty networks of the 12 major capital-
exporters (even if those treaty networks remain the core of the system in that they have 
generated roughly 90% of known investor claims).22 
                                                 
18 D. SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION 71-73, 95-108 
(Cambridge University Press 2008) (hereinafter SCHNEIDERMAN); B. Choudhury, Recapturing Public 
Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 793-95 (2008) (hereinafter Choudhury). 
19 E.g. Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka v Slovak Republic (24 May, 1999), 14 ICSID REV. 251, 
17(3) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 189 ($1.05 billion (U.S.; all amounts in this footnote are 
approximated including interest)); CME Republic BV v Czech Republic (13 September, 2001), 14(3) 
WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 109 ($350 million); CMS Gas Transmission Company v 
Argentine Republic (12 May, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 17(5) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 63 
($149 million). 
20 D. HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 15-19 (Oxford University Press 2005). 
21 M. Sornarajah, The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment, Paper for the 
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade 
Policy, Ottawa (12 September, 2002), available at: 
http://www.carleton.ca/ctpl/pdf/papers/sornarajah.pdf; I.T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the 
(Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 345 (2007); S. Spronk & C. 
Crespo, Water, National Sovereignty and Social Resistance: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Struggles against 
Multinational Water Companies in Cochabamba and El Alto, Bolivia, 1 L., SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. J. 
(2008), available at: http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2008_1/spronk_crespo. 
22 These 12 major capital-exporters are the U.S., U.K., Germany, France, the Netherlands, Hong 
Kong, Switzerland, Japan, Spain, Belgium, Canada, and Italy. The 12 are listed in order of total FDI 
outward stock for 2008 as reported in UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2009, 251-54 (New York 
and Geneva, United Nations, 2009) (hereinafter Major Capital-Exporters). In my own informal 
tracking of 396 known treaty-based claims where the relevant data was reported in publicly available 
awards or in news reporters (Investment Arbitration Reporter; Investment Treaty News) as of May 2009, I 
found that 90% (357) of the claims were brought by a national of one of these 12 capital-exporters 
against a developing or transition country pursuant to a BIT between the two states, to NAFTA, or 
to the Energy Charter Treaty (annex I of the Final Act of the European Energy Charter Conference) 
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
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In 1989, according to UNCTAD, there were 385 BITs, whereas by 1995 there were 
1173, and by 2000 there were 1941 (although not all were in force).23 In Latin America, by 
1989, just two countries (Belize and Panama) had agreed to a compulsory investor-state 
arbitration mechanism in a BIT with one of the 12 major capital-exporters; by 2005, another 
10 countries in the region had done so (Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, and Nicaragua).24 Among the emerging economies of 
China, India, and Brazil, only the former – which ratified numerous BITs in the 1980s as 
part of its economic liberalisation reforms of the period – had concluded a BIT with a major 
capital-exporter before 1990, and only after 2000 did China incorporate broad consents to 
investor-state arbitration in such treaties.25 India’s first BITs with a major capital-exporter 
came into force only in 1998 (with Germany and Italy, both signed in 1995) whereas Brazil 
has declined to ratify any BITs.26 
Even so, whether for reasons of ideology or rational choice27 and whether as a 
response to structural pressures at the international level28 or state capture by domestic 
economic elites,29 most countries joined the present regime in the 1990s. In doing so, they 
endorsed international arbitration as a governing arrangement to regulate and discipline their 
governments on behalf of foreign investors (but not vice versa) more directly and more 
comprehensively than any international adjudicative regime since the colonial era.30 
 
III. FOCUS ON “MUSCULAR” INVESTMENT TREATIES 
 
In examining this system, the discussion in this article focuses on five justifications 
commonly offered to support the system in its bold but nevertheless widespread form. 
Looking primarily at the treaties concluded by the major European and North American 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Lisbon, 17 December, 1994; 34 I.L.M. 373). Note that I did not attempt to account for forum-
shopping in collecting this descriptive data. Note also that Hong Kong and Japan accounted for none 
of the 357 claims. 
23 UNCTAD, Quantitative data on bilateral investment treaties and double taxation treaties (2002), available at: 
www.unctad.org/templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=3150&lang=1.  
24 UNCTAD List, supra note 16.  
25 These included BITs with three major capital-exporters (U.K., Japan, and Italy) during 1986-89. 
However, China did not conclude any further BITs with the major capital-exporters until after 2000. 
Since that year, three BITs between China and Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, respectively, 
have been signed and entered into force. UNCTAD List, supra note 16. On the BRIC countries and 
the investment treaty system, see M. Mortimore & L. Stanley, Justice Denied: Dispute Settlement in Latin 
America’s Trade and Investment Agreements, Working Group on Development and Environment in the 
Americas Discussion Paper No. 27 (October 2009), at 24-32, available at: 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/WorkingGroup.htm (hereinafter Mortimore & Stanley). 
26 UNCTAD List, supra note 16. 
27 A. Guzman, Why developing countries sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of BITs, 38 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 553 (1998); R.J. Bubb & S. Rose-Ackerman, BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of bilateral and 
multilateral regulation of foreign direct investment, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291 (2007). 
28 Z. Elkins, A.T. Guzman & B.A. Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811 (2006) (hereinafter Elkins, Guzman & Simmons). 
29 L. Collinson, Explaining Pareto-Inefficient International Cooperation Using Argentina’s Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, DESTIN Working Paper No. 08-87 (2008), at 22-5, available at: 
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/DESTIN/pdf/WP87.pdf (hereinafter Collinson). 
30 VAN HARTEN-INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 4, at ch 2.  
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
 7
capital-exporters – whose nationals have brought the great majority of known claims31 – as 
interpreted (often expansively) by investment arbitration tribunals, one may identify these 
“muscular” elements of the system: 
 
- investors are authorised to bring claims against states in relation to most or all aspects of 
the treaty rather than a more limited class of potential disputes, such as those involving 
the amount of compensation to be paid in the event of an expropriation. 
 
- investors can bring claims in arbitration forums at which voting power is concentrated in 
the major capital-exporting states (e.g. the World Bank) or an international business 
organisation (e.g. the International Chamber of Commerce). 
 
- investors can bring claims without having to exhaust local remedies in the host state, 
regardless of whether those remedies are capable of delivering justice. 
 
- investors can submit contractual disputes with the host state or a state entity to the 
arbitration mechanism under the investment treaty, even where the contract itself 
requires the resolution of disputes in another forum. 
 
- investors can forum-shop, i.e. they can acquire the status of a “foreign investor” under a 
treaty merely by establishing a holding company in a state party to that treaty. 
 
- arbitrators are authorised to regulate and discipline states based on broadly framed 
standards, such as protections from “unfair” or “inequitable” treatment and from 
“expropriation” or “deprivation”; 
 
- arbitrators are authorised to review the conduct of virtually any branch or entity of the 
state; 
 
- arbitrators are authorised to award money damages, as opposed to conventional public 
law remedies, where the state is found retrospectively to have violated its treaty 
obligations; 
 
- host states submit to pre-establishment national treatment for foreign investors rather 
than simply post-establishment non-discrimination.32 
 
- host states submit to a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause that is open to expansive 
interpretation by arbitrators such that it incorporates procedural and substantive 
elements in other investment treaties as requirements of MFN treatment. 
                                                 
31 Major Capital-Exporters, supra note 22.  
32 This element is limited to the U.S. model of investment treaty (which was emulated by Canada 
after NAFTA) although European countries have sought to incorporate this element into their treaty 
networks by concluding Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that adopt a positive list 
approach to pre-establishment national treatment as a complement to existing BIT networks of 
European states. G. Van Harten, Investment Provisions in Economic Partnership Agreements, Research paper 
(March 2008), available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461110. 
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
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- foreign states are authorised to enforce an award against an unsuccessful state based on 
the recognition and enforcement provisions of the ICSID Convention, the New York 
Convention, and/or the Panama Convention.33 
 
Most investment treaties incorporate many of these elements; many investment treaties 
reflect all or virtually all of them. These elements have all been defended, explicitly or 
implicitly, by advocates of the system, many of whom – it is important to highlight – are part 
of or closely connected to the investment arbitration industry.34 Moreover, advocates of the 
system usually do not differentiate between these elements of the treaties so as to reject one 
or another muscular component.35 Rather, most advocates tend to promote the system as a 
whole and, if they do differentiate among these elements, they tend to favour the system in 
its bold form. For these reasons, it is appropriate to focus on this muscular version of the 




A. Justification 1: Investment Treaties are a means to encourage Foreign Investment 
 
A common argument in support of the system is that it is a means for states to encourage 
foreign investment into their territory (especially from the other state party to the treaty).36 
Thus, we might say that Ecuador, wishing to encourage investment from the U.S., could 
conclude an investment treaty with the U.S. in order to signal its commitment to accept and 
protect U.S. investors, thus encouraging them to invest in Ecuador rather than another 
locale. The logic may appear almost self-evident. However,  there are number of difficulties 
                                                 
33 ICSID Convention, supra note 10; United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 10 June, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into 
force 7 June, 1959) (hereinafter the New York Convention); Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Panama, 30 January, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 336) (hereinafter the 
Panama Convention). 
34 By “investment arbitration industry”, I refer broadly to persons who sit as investment arbitrators; 
to key actors in the major organizations for international commercial and investment arbitration, 
such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration, 
and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; and to lawyers and legal experts who derive substantial 
income from the litigation of investment treaty claims. Notably, the business model of the industry is 
built essentially on the payment of legal and arbitration fees by claimants and by states and on the 
promise of payment of compensation to investors, especially by governments of developing and 
transition countries. 
35 Supra note 3. 
36 See, for example, R. Dolzer, The Impact of International Investment Treaties on Domestic Administrative Law, 
37 INT’L L. & POL. 953, 953-54 (2005) (hereinafter Dolzer); PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 240 (“The 
occasional costs of having offered international protection of investors’ rights appear minuscule 
compared to the macroeconomic effects of the treaty overall”). For a useful discussion of this 
explanation for investment treaties and possible implications of it being unsupported by compelling 
evidence, see J.W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, 8 STUD. INT’L FIN. ECON. & 
TECH. L. 241, 245 (2007) (hereinafter Salacuse); K. J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International 
Investment Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157 (2005). 
Forthcoming: 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 1 (2010). 
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with this justification, arising both from the text of investment treaties and from the 
empirical evidence. 
 Here, let me highlight three points about the text of investment treaties which raise 
difficulties. The first is that many of the treaties take a liberal approach to forum-shopping. 
Put differently, they allow owners of assets to pick and choose among nationalities at their 
convenience for the purpose of bringing investment treaty claims against countries in which 
they own assets. An investor may acquire the nationality of a state party to the treaty, thus 
gaining access to the treaty, merely by setting up a holding company in that state. Likewise, 
an investment that was originally domestic – in that it was owned by nationals of the state in 
question – can be made “foreign” merely by a paper transfer of ownership to a foreign 
entity.37 Most surprisingly (based on an expansive jurisdictional ruling by two of the three 
arbitrators in Tokios38) a domestic business can apparently make itself “foreign” so as to bring 
a claim against its own country simply by creating a holding company in a state that is party 
to a BIT with the home country. 
 There are various explanations and rationales for the strange decision of states to 
allow this legal maneuvering and gaming by investors. Yet if the aim of investment treaties is 
to encourage foreign investment between the states parties to the treaty – and not to extend 
special legal rights and privileges broadly to an international class of corporate owners of 
assets – then the expansive approach to forum-shopping that is enabled by broad language 
in many of the treaties and, in turn, by the permissive interpretations of some arbitrators 
makes no sense. Indeed, it undermines the entire conceptual framework for the negotiation 
of investment treaties whose purpose is simply to encourage investment flows between the 
territories of the states parties to the treaty. 
 A second point that calls into question this justification is that few, if any, investment 
treaties place enforceable obligations on the home states of investors to encourage or 
facilitate outward investment by, for instance, liberalizing their own regulatory regimes or 
enhancing their programs for investment insurance. This is anomalous if the purpose of an 
investment treaty is indeed to encourage capital flows between the states parties. Home 
states might, for instance, commit to subsidizing regulatory risk insurance for investments 
that are covered by the treaty. Further, they might require the use of that insurance to 
supplement the compensatory regime of the treaty in cases where an investor has suffered 
losses due to general regulatory activity by the host state. On this basis, the regulatory risks 
that are inherent in foreign investment, and in all forms of business decision-making in the 
face of changing social, economic, and environmental conditions, would be shared between 
host and home state. Instead of obligating home states to take such steps, investment treaties 
typically establish subrogation rights of political risk insurance or guarantee programs in 
order to allow the home country to step into the shoes of the investor in advancing a claim 
against the host country.39 In this respect, the purpose appears to be more about protecting 
the economic position of home states where a dispute has arisen between one of its 
nationals and another state than about encouraging investment flows. 
 A third point concerning the texts of investment treaties is that most of them apply 
to existing investments. However, if the purpose of the treaty is to attract investment, why 
                                                 
37 Fedax NV v Republic of Venezuela (11 July, 1997), 5 ICSID REP. 186, 37 I.L.M. 1378. 
38 Tokios Tokelès v Ukraine (29 April, 2004), 20 ICSID REV. 205, 16(4) WORLD TRADE & ARB. 
MATERIALS 75 (hereinafter Tokios). 
39 R. DOLZER & M. STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 156 (Kluwer Law International 
1995). 
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apply it to investments that have already been attracted? One might expect that capital-
importing states would prefer not to extend an investment treaty to existing investments, 
limiting it instead to new investments and to re-investments in the host economy by existing 
investors. Why would a state make extensive legal concessions, and put the state treasury at 
significant risk, in the case of investments already won? 
Of course, various explanations could be offered. One is that the major capital-exporters 
were aggressive in insisting that existing investments be protected and that all (or virtually) 
capital-importing countries gave into this pressure over the course of the hundreds of 
investment treaties now in force. Another explanation is that capital-importers were driven 
by an ideological commitment to openness and to the attraction of foreign capital, whether 
or not the investments were already in place. Another is that these states were not well 
informed about what they were negotiating and, as a result, made bad decisions. I do not 
suggest that any of these explanations is particularly compelling. All or none of them might 
play a role in the experiences of different countries and treaties. But this and other features 
of the great majority of investment treaties casts doubt on the explanation that states 
concluded such treaties so as to encourage foreign investment. 
 Doubts about this justification for investment treaties are supported by the fact that 
empirical research to date is at best mixed on the issue of whether the treaties actually 
encourage investment. I have reviewed eight empirical studies on the proposition that they 
do encourage investment, of which five found little or no positive connection between the 
conclusion of investment treaties and an increase in foreign direct investment. To 
summarize, in 1998, UNCTAD concluded that BITs played a “minor and secondary role in 
influencing FDI flows”.40 In a comprehensive study, Hallward-Dreimeier analyzed FDI 
flows from OECD to developing countries during 1980-2000 and found a “significant 
negative finding on the impact of ratifying a BIT”.41 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman found that 
BITs have “little impact” on the attraction of FDI, although they may have an impact in 
countries with higher political risks, and that “signing a BIT with the United States does not 
correspond to increased FDI flows”.42 Salacuse and Sullivan, in contrast, find a positive 
effect on FDI flows for U.S. BITs but less so for BITs concluded by other OECD 
countries.43 Neumayer and Spess in a 2005 study found a positive and statistically significant 
effect of BITs on FDI flows and that, the greater the number of BITs signed with capital-
exporting countries, the greater the amount of FDI, thus offering “the first hard evidence 
that there is a payoff to a developing country’s willingness to incur the costs of negotiating 
                                                 
40 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, UN Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7 (1998), at 
141-2. 
41 M. Hallward-Dreimeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract Foreign Direct Investment? Only a Bit… 
and They Could Bite, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3121 (2003), at 19. 
42 J. Tobin & S. Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing 
Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Center for Law, Economics and Policy Research 
Paper No. 293, Yale Law School (2004) at 19, 22, 31. In a second study, using new data, the authors 
concluded that the number of BITs that a country has signed with a high income country affected 
positively the amount of FDI inflow, but that the marginal benefit of an extra BIT to the host 
country declined as more and more countries concluded investment treaties. J. Tobin & S. Rose-
Ackerman, Bilateral Investment Treaties: Do They Stimulate Foreign Direct Investment?, available at: 
http//ssrn.com (2006) at 18-21. 
43 J.W. Salacuse & N.P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and 
Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005). 
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BITs and to succumb to the restrictions on sovereignty”.44 Yet, applying Neumayer and 
Spess’ model, Yackee found the relationship of BITs to FDI flows to be marginal and much 
smaller than Neumayer and Spess suggested and that their findings “rest on quite unstable 
ground” and “are far less robust” than a casual reading of their study would suggest.45 
Finally, in a recent qualitative study, Poulsen used qualitative evidence based on interviews 
with political risk insurers to supplement the quantitative studies to date and concluded 
that;46 
 
“… quantitative and qualitative data currently available suggests that while BITs 
undoubtedly play a role in some investment projects, they are highly unlikely to be a 
determining factor for the vast majority of foreign investors determining where, and 
how much, to invest.” 
 
 Thus, there is, at best, conflicting evidence that investment treaties actually 
encourage foreign investment (and in turn that any signalling effect of the treaties has actual 
effects on investor decision-making about where to commit capital). As such, and in light of 
the risks assumed by states under the treaties, it is dubious, not to say reckless, for anyone to 
assert today that the treaties are a vehicle to encourage actual investments. Also, it is clear 
that in the 1990s – when so many of the treaties were concluded – there was no empirical 
evidence that they served this stated purpose. Most states therefore committed themselves to 
what are arguably the most financially risk-laden international obligations in the world today 
without a credible empirical basis for the claim that the treaties would achieve their stated 
purpose. 
 In the 1990s, one could claim reasonably that a lack of evidence about the benefits of 
investment treaties was matched by a lack of evidence about their risks. There were only a 
handful of investment treaty awards against states prior to the mid-1990s and there was 
arguably limited understanding of the scope of the general and prospective consents of states 
to compulsory arbitration.47 Since the explosion of claims in the late 1990s, however, 
hundreds of additional treaties have been concluded. Why would states continue to conclude 
(or decline to withdraw from) a treaty model for which there was no evidence that they 
actually encouraged investment, while carrying serious risks and liabilities for states? One 
explanation is that the encouragement of investment is not a key consideration for 
governments that have continued to conclude more and more treaties. If the aim was to 
encourage investment, those states would presumably have taken steps to enhance the role 
of the treaties in this respect. Alternatively, one may conclude that it simply takes time for 
evolving knowledge and evidence about the system to influence official decision-making. 
 Whatever the explanation, the key point is that this justification for the system is 
contradicted by a number of common provisions in investment treaties and unsupported by 
                                                 
44 E. Neumayer & L. Spess, Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing 
countries?, at 5, LSE Research Online, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000627. 
45 J.W. Yackee, Sacrificing Sovereignty: Bilateral Investment Treaties, International Arbitration, and the Quest for 
Capital, USC Center in Law, Economics and Organizational Research Paper No. C06-15 (2006), at 
51. 
46 L.S. Poulsen, The Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the 
Evidence, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2009/2010 (K. 
Sauvant ed., forthcoming 2010). 
47 C. McLachlan, Commentary: The Broader Context, 18 ARB. INT’L 339, 340 (2002). 
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the preponderance of empirical evidence. If this justification was a major factor in the 
decisions of many states to conclude investment treaties – or of international organizations 
to promote the investment treaty model – then these decisions appear to have been based on 
incomplete knowledge about the expected linkages between the treaties and capital flows. 
Likewise, in the absence of stronger evidence that the treaties actually encourage investment, 
a major plank in the wider case for the treaties as contributors to sustainable development 
and to social welfare falls away.48 
 
B. Justification 2: Investment Treaties respond to the Bias and Unreliability of Domestic Courts 
 
It is often pointed out by advocates for investment treaty arbitration that domestic remedies 
in developing and transition states, and even in developed states, are inadequate because they 
take much too long, are biased, are corrupt, or are otherwise unreliable.49 In its more 
aggressive form, this argument mutates into a rejection of courts in general because the 
judicial process entails too careful and time-consuming consideration of a dispute and too 
many opportunities for appeal, to permit the desired speed and clarity in business decision-
making. More commonly, however, this justification is not framed so as to condemn all 
courts as biased against foreign investors. It is said, rather, that the courts of some countries 
are non-functional or biased or corrupt so as to make them unreliable, and on this at least 
there can be little doubt (without going so far as to name particular countries). Domestic 
legal systems may be inaccessible or take too long; judges may be corrupt or otherwise 
incapable of ensuring fairness. 
As a matter of principle, states should work to address this problem for all investors, 
domestic or foreign, and indeed for all citizens. Those who promote investment treaties as a 
response to the weaknesses of domestic legal systems, therefore, might also be expected to 
champion provisions in investment treaties that seek to address the unreliability of courts for 
investors and non-investors alike. The treaties could, for example, allow citizens that have a 
grievance against a foreign investor – due to major environmental damage or human rights 
abuse that it has allegedly caused, for example50 – to bring an international claim against the 
investor where the domestic legal system does not offer them an expeditious and fair 
process. Likewise, in the absence of broader access by non-investors to the process of 
international adjudication of investment disputes, it might be acknowledged that investment 
arbitration itself appears unfair. This is because fairness usually calls for all parties that are 
affected by the resolution of a dispute to be given standing in the adjudicative process and 
because, in investment treaty arbitration, only one class of private interests – the investor – 
has the right to be heard directly. Others affected by the conduct of the state or of the 
investor are barred from party status and thus from the right to introduce evidence, make 
                                                 
48 J.E. Stiglitz, Multinational Corporations: Balancing Rights and Responsibilities, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 3, 4 (2007). 
49 J. Paulsson, Enclaves of Justice, Presentation to the Rule of Law Conference, University of Richmond 
School of Law (12 April, 2007); T.W. Wälde, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-
Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 63, 77-78 (P. Kahn & T.W. Wälde eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2007) 
(hereinafter Wälde). 
50 Miles, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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submissions, and otherwise participate fully in the process.51 If domestic remedies are 
unreliable, then why allow investors alone to take part in the international adjudicative 
process? 
 The response of the treaties to this rationale for the system are therefore under-
inclusive. It extends the benefits of international arbitration to a narrow class of private 
actors, giving foreign investors the unique opportunity to resort to domestic or international 
options (or both) as they prefer. Of course, not all foreign investors are well positioned by 
the system to bring a claim against a state that has abused them in some way.52 The cost of 
access, in particular, precludes many foreign investors ever from bringing a claim.53 On the 
other hand, there is a class of large firms that have substantial wealth wrapped up abroad 
which can utilize the system in a range of potent ways. Most problematically, when one 
considers the lack of access by other interests in the process, large firms are uniquely 
positioned to use the system in order to challenge state measures that are aimed generally at 
advancing a development strategy, stabilizing the financial system, promoting human rights, 
protecting public health and the environment, etc.54 
 This raises a second difficulty with the present justification in light of the system’s 
design. The treaties are over-inclusive because they do not account for situations in which 
domestic courts do offer justice to a foreign investor.55 By removing the duty to exhaust 
local remedies unconditionally, many investment treaties allow investors to turn their back 
entirely on domestic law or,56 indeed, to game the system by bringing multiple claims under 
the treaty (or multiple treaties57) and in domestic courts.58 The investor has the sole 
discretion, unlike in other treaty regimes that allow individual claims, to decide on the 
reliability, suitability, and so on of the alternative remedies. Combined with the permissive 
approach to forum-shopping endorsed by most of the arbitration tribunals, this allows much 
maneuvering by corporate lawyers to maximize the pressure on host governments and thus 
enhance the prospect of public compensation for their clients. This gives immense power to 
a class of large foreign investors that is unavailable to other investors and, of course, to 
citizens and communities in general. 
 Based on this justification for the system, then, one would expect a rational 
connection between the treaty provisions and the purported rationale. If the concern was 
that domestic courts systems in some countries are unreliable, then the duty to exhaust local 
                                                 
51 J. Alvarez, Critical Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter Eleven, 28 U. MIAMI 
INTER-AM. L. REV. 303, 307-09 (1997). 
52 J. Kurtz, The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in Investor-State Arbitration: Competition and its Discontents, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 758 (2009). 
53 Wälde, supra note 49, at 87-88. 
54 L.E. Peterson, The Global Governance of Foreign Direct Investment: Madly Off in All Directions, Dialogue 
on Globalization Occasional Paper No. 19 (Geneva: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2005) at 17-21. 
55 Republic of South Africa, Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework – Government Position Paper 
(Pretoria: Department of Trade and Industry, June 2009), at 45 (hereinafter Republic of South 
Africa). 
56 In the absence of a fork-in-the-road clause applied robustly by the arbitration tribunal (many 
tribunals have interpreted away such clauses where the domestic claims were pursued by a different 
corporate entity from, although it was closely related to, the company that brought the treaty claim). 
57 Lauder (Ronald S) v Czech Republic (3 September, 2001), 4 WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 
35 (2002); CME Republic BV v Czech Republic (13 September, 2001), 14(3) WORLD TRADE & ARB. 
MATERIALS 109. 
58 Infra note 107. 
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remedies should be removed selectively in such circumstances. Or, at least, the treaties 
should allow a state to demonstrate – based on a rigorous threshold – that its legal system 
does offer justice to a foreign investor, as a basis for removing a tribunal’s jurisdiction over 
the claim. Likewise, the question of the reliability of the host country’s courts should be 
decided by an independent tribunal, and not by the foreign investor or the state. 
Yet we do not see such provisions in the treaties. Instead, the duty to exhaust local 
remedies is removed unconditionally,59 even for countries that have mature and advanced 
systems of justice; indeed, it is removed for systems that far surpass investment arbitration 
itself for their institutionalized fairness, openness, and independence. Also, the treaties 
remove the duty to exhaust local remedies in the case of developing and transition states that 
do offer high standards of access to justice or that have made major advances in this 
direction. As a result, the treaties do not leave space for recognition and acknowledgement 
of variations in the quality of domestic legal systems. 
  
C. Justification 3: Investment Arbitration advances fairness and the rule of law in the resolution of 
Investment Disputes 
 
The next justification is connected to the criticism of domestic legal systems that is implicit 
in the unconditional removal of the duty to exhaust local remedies, as discussed above. It is 
the further claim that investment treaties have replaced domestic law and courts with a fair, 
independent, and neutral process of adjudication to resolve investor-state disputes and that 
the system advances the rule of law.60 This is a dubious claim, as I have argued elsewhere,61 if 
we assume that the rule of law rests on high standards of procedural fairness in adjudication 
(and, as such, institutional safeguards of independence), especially at the final level of 
adjudicative decision-making. The problem is that, on close scrutiny, the system of 
investment treaty arbitration does not satisfy this requirement of the rule of law. 
 The problem is unique to investment treaty arbitration because it is a form of 
(formally non-reciprocal) public law adjudication and because investment treaty arbitrators 
lack institutional safeguards of their independence, especially security of tenure. This would 
not be a major issue if the matters decided by the arbitrators were minor concerns or subject 
to thorough review by an independent court. Neither is true however. Investment treaty 
arbitrators often resolve, on a final basis, fundamental matters of public law without the 
prospect of close scrutiny by independent judges, whether domestic or international. As a 
result, longstanding safeguards of judicial independence in domestic systems of justice have 
                                                 
59 Or with very limited conditions such as a 6-month duty of the investor to seek (but without any 
duty to obtain) a friendly resolution of the dispute. 
60 C.N. Brower & L.A. Steven, Who Then Should Judge? Developing the International Rule of Law under 
NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 193, 195-97, 200-02 (2001) (hereinafter Brower & Steven); 
S.D. Franck, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 GLOBAL BUS. 
& DEV. L.J. 337, 340 (2007); Z. Douglas, Nothing if Not Critical for Investment Treaty Arbitration: 
Occidental, Eureko and Methanex, 22 ARB. INT’L 27, 27, 51 (2006); Dolzer, supra note 36, at 971-72; 
PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 265; Salacuse, supra note 36, at 247; Wälde, supra note 49, at 95, 101-02; 
I.A. Laird, NAFTA Chapter 11 Meets Chicken Little, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 223, 229 (2001) (hereinafter 
Laird). 
61 G. Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW (T. Wälde & S. Schill eds., 
Oxford University Press (forthcoming 2010). 
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been abandoned in the unique context where foreign investors bring international claims 
against states and, by extension, the people who are represented by states. 
 Security of tenure is one of the core safeguards of adjudicative independence in 
public law.62 It is not an “artificial” attribute of judging (as was suggested to me by one 
arbitrator at a conference in 200863); rather, in the Western liberal tradition, it has for 
centuries been central to the notion of judicial independence both from powerful private 
interests and from other branches of the state. It emerged as a response to abuse of power 
by kings and queens and, as such, it forms part of the institutional apparatus that has limited 
and refined sovereign power in the modern state. By removing it, as investment treaties 
clearly do, states have returned us to a model of adjudicative decision-making that is directly 
dependent on the discretion of executive officials in powerful governments and, remarkably, 
in international business organizations and in the arbitration industry. That is a strange way 
to promote the rule of law if this was indeed an aim of the investment treaty system. 
 Combined with other institutional safeguards of judicial independence – including 
the state’s provision of a set salary for the judge, bars on outside remuneration, and an 
objective means of allocating adjudicators to specific cases – security of tenure insulates 
judges from the appearance of inappropriate pressure on their decision-making and, by 
extension, allows the courts to provide a foundation for the rule of law. Without secure 
tenure for the judges who decide public law, one must ask, where does the judge’s career 
interest lay? Where one can credibly show that the judges may be financially or economically 
beholden to public or private interests that have a stake in the case or in the interpretation of 
the law, then the appearance of independence – and appearances are key in this respect given 
the difficulties of proving or disproving actual bias64 – is seriously undermined. 
 What is wrong with investment treaty arbitration in this respect? The first problem is 
that the system is a one-way process of public law claims where only one class of parties (the 
investors) triggers use of the system by bringing claims, and only the other class (states) is 
liable to pay awards for violating the treaty. Unlike in other situations where arbitration is 
used, the ability to bring claims is non-reciprocal. Thus, arbitrators, especially those whose 
careers are intertwined with the interests of the arbitration industry (in their classic 1996 
study, Dezaley and Garth called these arbitrators “specialist” or “technocrat” arbitrators)65, 
are reasonably seen to have an interest in encouraging claims and arbitrator appointments, by 
interpreting the law in favour of prospective claimants. However much it may be presented 
as a “court”, arbitration is a private business and (usually) a career path for those who are 
employed in the adjudication of investment disputes. 
To illustrate this concern, I note the following conclusions of Dezaley and Garth, 
who drew on extensive interviews with arbitrators and lawyers in the field of international 
commercial arbitration, on the arbitration industry: 66 
 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 This view was expressed by an arbitrator at the Harvard Law School conference, The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration (19 April, 2008). I have withheld the arbitrator’s name because it was not 
clear at the time whether the comment was meant for attribution. 
64 See, for example, Locabail v Bayfield Properties, [2000] QB 451, 471-72. 
65 Y. DEZALEY & B. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
& THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (University of Chicago Press 1996) 
(hereinafter DEZALEY & GARTH). 
66 Id. 
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“The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators... provides a key to 
understanding the justice that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators.”67 
 
“The new generation of [arbitration] technocrats... emphasizes their ability to satisfy 
the consumers in order to gain repeat business.”68 
 
“For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the autonomy 
necessary for legitimacy while at the same time manifesting sufficient fidelity to the 
economic powers who must in the end find these services worth purchasing and 
deploying.”69 
 
“It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other acquaintances who 
bring nice arbitration matters by letting them have limited access to the arbitration 
market. This system of exchange of favors is essential to success in arbitration, a 
career dependent on personal relations.”70 
 
“The growth of the market in arbitration is also evident in the competition that can be 
seen among different national approaches and centres.”71  
 
“They [the newcomer arbitrators of the 1980s and 1990s] present themselves... as 
international arbitration professionals, and also as entrepreneurs selling their services 
to business practitioners....”72  
 
“The ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] has... become one of the principal 
places where the “politics” of arbitration is elaborated and expressed. There are 
innumerable committees and multiple networks of influence that gravitate around 
this institution. The [ICC International Court of Arbitration], for example, which is 
really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions, 
appears to be particularly sensitive to the business clientele....”73 
 
“The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction of these 
legal services that serve them.”74 
 
 
What these comments convey is that arbitrators operate in a marketplace and that this 
appears likely to affect how they make decisions. Arbitrators supply “symbolic capital” based 
on their reputations and thus have an interest to further their position and that of the 
industry.75 The industry is made up of cross-connected players who affiliate around 
                                                 
67 Id., at 9. 
68 Id., at 194. 
69 Id., at 70. 
70 Id., at 124. 
71 Id., at 7 (emphasis in original). 
72 Id., at 36. 
73 Id., at 45. 
74 Id., at 93. 
75 Id., at 8, 18. 
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prominent centres of arbitration such as the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. 
Arbitrators often name each other for appointments and may exclude those who are not 
accepted within the industry’s networks. With the passing of the old generation of gentleman 
arbitrators, according to Dezaley and Garth, the new technocrat arbitrators are more intent 
on promoting the industry in competition with its alternatives (in the present context, 
domestic courts and international diplomacy).76 Arbitrators, unlike judges, can earn income 
from activities beyond their adjudicative role.77 Prominent figures in the industry often sit as 
arbitrators while advising and representing claimants or respondents and while promoting 
arbitration clauses in investment contracts, treaties, or arbitration rules.78 
 This provides a basis for reasonable suspicion of bias in the investment treaty 
system. It raises precisely the sorts of concerns that institutional safeguards of independence 
dispel by removing judges from the adjudicative marketplace and positioning them instead 
within a public institution. It must be obvious to anyone working in the industry, as to the 
informed outsider, that investment arbitration cannot thrive unless international businesses 
consider it worthwhile to bring claims and unless powerful states also see benefits in the 
system.79 Arbitrators will no doubt vary in their level of commitment to values of fairness in 
adjudication and in their sensitivity to the “economic powers” in investment arbitration.80 
But anyone who seeks future or continued success as an arbitrator has reason to promote 
the system among future claimants while defending it from possible rejection by powerful 
states. Because this creates a credible appearance of bias in the system, and because the 
issues at stake involve public law, investment treaty arbitration is, in institutional terms, 
inconsistent with the rule of law. 
 The second issue, arising also from the lack of institutional safeguards of 
independence in the system, involves the role of the organizations that are designated as 
appointing authorities under investment treaties. These organizations – of which ICSID is 
the most prominent – exercise fundamental powers within the system. They appoint the 
presiding arbitrator in the absence of agreement by the disputing parties or where a party 
(usually the state) has declined to appoint its own arbitrator. They often play an active role in 
directing the negotiations between the disputing parties on who to appoint by proposing a 
list of prospective arbitrators which the authority would be inclined to select. And, even 
when the appointing authority is not active in this respect, the residual role of the appointing 
authority provides the backdrop for the parties’ joint decision on who to appoint. Further, if 
a party claims a conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator, then the claim is resolved by 
the appointing authority. Finally, appointing authorities may exercise key supervisory powers 
over the arbitration rules and over awards issued in particular cases. In the case of ICSID, 
                                                 
76 Id., at 50. 
77 Id., at 49-50; J.A.F. Costa, American and European Investment Arbitrators: A Single Culture?, Paper 
presented to Law and Society Association and the Canadian Law and Society Association conference 
on Placing Law, Montréal (30 May, 2008) at 7-8. 
78 N. Majeed, Investor-State Disputes and International Law: From the Far Side, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
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arbitrators). 
79 W Mattli, Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration, 55 INT’L ORG. 919, 921-22 
(2001). 
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awards are subject to annulment proceedings before an annulment tribunal, all three 
members of which are appointed by the President of the World Bank.81 
 The key problem here is that executive officials, however proficient and neutral they 
may be at an individual level, have key discretionary powers over critical steps in the 
adjudicative process. Institutional safeguards that would serve to address the concerns 
arising from this executive control of the process (i.e. safeguards such as an objective 
method of assignment of judges to cases and the resolution of conflict of interest against a 
judge by an independent adjudicative process) are absent. Thus, one may ask, for instance, 
whether the appointing authority is sufficiently impartial and independent and whether its 
power structure reflects a balance between the interests of capital-exporting and capital-
importing countries. As it stands, virtually all of the organizations that act as appointing 
authorities under the treaties have a decided slant in favour of the interests of capital-
exporting states82 or international business.83 This supports a perception that the interests of 
a powerful state or a multinational firm, where implicated by the relevant dispute, have 
influenced the appointing authority in the exercise of its powers. Put differently, it creates a 
perception of bias within the system that favours the position of prospective claimants, of 
powerful states that hold power in the appointing authorities, and of private interests in the 
arbitration industry. 
 This structure may be an intended outcome on the part of the major states that 
originally designed investment treaties and thus the system. It is also presumably a desirable 
aspect of the present system for entities like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), 
which has pushed successfully for a regime that is highly favourable to its members and that 
happens also to provide new market opportunities for ICC arbitrators. Even so, such a 
structure is not defensible on grounds of procedural fairness and judicial independence. If 
the aim were to advance these values, a more obvious choice would be the use of an 
international body that incorporated safeguards of judicial independence to decide investor-
state disputes. So long as such a body was characterized by the relevant safeguards, this 
would offer a credible case for the present justification of the system. Absent serious 
consideration of this option by major states, and considering the defensive reactions of some 
                                                 
81 ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 52(3). See generally, ICSID Convention, arts. 38, 52(3), and 
58; Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, U.N. G.A. 
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6(3), 7(2)-7(3), 12 (hereinafter UNCITRAL Rules); Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber 
of Commerce, revised 1 January, 1998, arts. 8 and 11(3) (hereinafter ICC Rules). 
82 E.g. under the ICSID Convention, supra note 10, art. 38, the President of the World Bank exercises 
the power to appoint. This is an official who is customarily a nominee of the U.S. Administration and 
who is in turn approved by other major states on the World Bank’s Board of Directors. Likewise, 
whereas some investment treaties allocate this power instead to the Secretary General of ICSID, this 
is an official who is appointed by a vote of the states parties to the ICSID Convention based on a 
nomination by the World Bank President. 
83 E.g. under investment treaties that designate the International Chamber of Commerce as 
appointing authority by allowing investors to bring claims under the ICC Rules. At the International 
Chamber of Commerce, this power is exercised by its International Court of Arbitration. Under the 
ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the ICC’s International Court of Arbitration, the members of 
which are chosen by the ICC world council of business on the recommendation of the ICC 
Executive Board. ICC Rules, supra note 81, arts. 1, 9(3)), and app I (Statute of the International Court 
of Arbitration of the ICC, art 3). 
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in the arbitration industry to the idea, one has reason to question this justification for the 
system. 
 
D. Justification 4: Investment Treaties affirm the Sovereignty and Bargaining Strategies of States 
 
Investment treaties have been criticized on the grounds that many states allegedly did not 
appreciate the risks and obligations they were undertaking when they joined the system in 
the 1990s. This has been met with approbation by some advocates of the system, who say 
this criticism is patronizing towards developing and transition countries. One senior 
arbitrator, in a statement to the email listserv OGEMID84, characterized this criticism as a 
“shopworn and offensive canard that capital-importing countries cannot evaluate texts 
pressed upon them by foreigners”.85 
No doubt the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes of the country that 
could not evaluate the treaties and the country that anticipated all their implications. That is, 
we may presume that states had something between zero and perfect information when they 
concluded the treaties that brought them into the system. It is perhaps more fruitful to ask 
whether states in general, especially in the 1990s, tended to have a sophisticated or 
unsophisticated understanding of the new regime. Examining the treaty texts and, more 
broadly, the political context for NAFTA,86 I tend to see more evidence for the latter 
position than the former. As such, I suggest here that governments in capital-importing and 
capital-exporting states alike may not have appreciated the consequences of the treaties and, 
especially, the investor-state arbitration mechanism for competing principles of legislative 
supremacy, governmental flexibility, and judicial independence, in particular. 
 
 1. Did states carry out a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis? 
 
Let us begin with the notion that most states had a sophisticated understanding of the 
treaties when they entered the system. This view operates from a position of trust in the 
commitment and capacity of public officials to make good decisions on behalf of their 
people. It reflects an ideal that no government can attain perfectly, but to which all should of 
course aspire. Incidentally, in this respect, this view is somewhat in conflict with the 
assumptions that underlie justification 3 for the system regarding the reliability of domestic 
legal systems, as invoked by advocates of the system. But it is nonetheless laudatory to 
expect that public officials would not change dramatically their policies on investment and 
on international arbitration, via investment treaties, without careful consideration of the 
implications. This assumption is supported also by the decisions of many states – notably, 
Argentina, which has faced a flood of claims for immense sums – to maintain their treaty 
networks in the face of clear evidence of the risks and liabilities. 
 Also consistent with this perspective is the more pragmatic claim that, in concluding 
investment treaties, states made careful bargaining choices to relinquish their rights under 
                                                 
84 Oil Gas Energy Mining Infrastructure And Investment Disputes, a commercial listserve and 
discussion forum on international dispute management (hereinafter OGEMID). My understanding is 
that OGEMID operates under Chatham House rules whereby the information and opinions 
expressed may be cited, but based on anonymity for the source. I am tempted in the interests of open 
debate not to respect this rule for OGEMID, but shall err on the side of prudence. 
85 OGEMID contribution of 10 April, 2007. 
86 J.R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF “FREE TRADE” (Hill and Wang 2000). 
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customary international law in exchange for substantial benefits. In examining this 
proposition we may ask, did this bargaining choice reflect a careful weighing of costs and 
benefits based on a sound understanding of the treaties? In terms of the benefits, as 
discussed above in relation to Justification 187, it is highly questionable to claim that states 
were well informed about the likelihood that investment treaties would encourage actual 
investment. If it is true, as much of the empirical work suggests, that the treaties have done 
little to attract investment, then states opted to constrain their policy options and transfer 
major powers to foreign investors and to arbitrators without receiving in exchange any 
measurable benefit in terms of actual investment. For a start, this does not seem like a good 
bargain. 
 Moreover, and quite remarkably, many of the treaties are non-reciprocal not only in 
effect (in that capital flows between the states parties are predominantly one-way such that 
the capital-importing country assumes most of the actual liabilities created by the treaty) but 
also in law.88 This is because the obligations assumed by the states parties under some of the 
treaties are explicitly unequal. In my own review of BITs over the past five years,89 I have 
always found that such inequality operated in favour of a major capital-exporting party and 
at the expense of a developing or transition state. The inequality is especially prominent in 
the exceptions that are incorporated by the U.S. or Canada90 to their treaty obligations to 
provide national treatment and most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, especially at the pre-
establishment stage. (Because of the significance of the commitment to pre-establishment 
national or MFN treatment, states often incorporate wide-ranging exceptions to these 
obligations.) 
 For instance, in a review of the four BITs concluded between the U.S. or Canada 
and an Andean Community state, it emerged that the scope and content of these exceptions 
were unequal.91 For example, in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, the U.S. reserved a long list of 
sectors and activities from its pre-establishment obligations: 
 




                                                 
87 Supra. note 39,40. 
88 E. Neumayer, Self-interest, foreign need and good governance: are bilateral investment treaty programs similar to 
aid allocation?, at 10-11, LSE Research Online (2006), available at: 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000808. 
89 Which has not been a systematic empirical review, but rather a series of periodic studies of a total 
of several hundred treaties selected on an eclectic basis over the course of different projects. 
90 European states do not commit to either national treatment or MFN treatment at the pre-
establishment stage in their investment treaties and so have no need to include the same exceptions. 
91 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Washington, 27 August, 1993; entered 
into force 11 May, 1997); Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
the Republic of Ecuador for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Quito, 29 
April, 1996; entered into force 6 June, 1997); Treaty between the Government of the United States 
and the Government of the Republic of Bolivia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment (Santiago, 17 April, 1998; entered into force 6 June, 2001); Agreement 
Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (14 
November, 2006; entered into force 20 June, 2007). 
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- customhouse brokers 
 
- government grants 
 
- government insurance and loan programs 
 




- maritime services and maritime-related services 
 
- mining on the public domain 
 
- ocean and coastal shipping 
 
- ownership of real property 
 
- ownership and operation of common carrier radio and television stations 
 
- ownership of shares in the Communications Satellite Corporation 
 
- primary dealership in United States government securities 
 
- provision of common carrier telephone and telegraph services 
 
- provision of submarine cable services 
 
- use of land and natural resources 
 
By comparison, Ecuador reserved very few sectors and activities: 
 
- traditional fishing (not including fish processing or aquaculture)  
 
- ownership and operation of broadcast radio and television stations 
 
Thus, the U.S.-Ecuador BIT is unequal in terms of the scope of pre-establishment 
obligations that are assumed by the states parties. The U.S. has reserved for itself the right to 
maintain foreign admission and ownership restrictions, thus allowing it to maintain national 
control of strategic sectors and to preference domestic capital. U.S. banks, for example, are 
protected from competition in their home markets from Ecuadorian banks, but have the 
right to establish themselves and compete in Ecuador.92 Ecuador, on the other hand, has 
                                                 
92 Of course, it is unlikely that Ecuador would have a sufficient base of capital to generate domestic 
investors that could in turn acquire ownership and control in strategic sectors in the U.S. That said, 
by forum-shopping, a holding company in Ecuador could be used as a vehicle for foreign capital 
from elsewhere to enter the U.S. economy. 
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relinquished its right to limit and screen foreign investment such that it must open its 
economy to foreign entry and ownership. 
 This inequality under investment treaties is present, to varying degrees, in all four 
BITs concluded by the U.S. or Canada with an Andean Community country.93 In each case, 
the developing state is given much less policy space to screen or condition foreign 
investment or to preference domestic firms.94 This is counter-intuitive from a development 
perspective, in that major capital-exporting states have reserved the ability to protect their 
economies and pursue a national industrial policy while their developing country 
counterpart, presumably without a strong base of domestic firms that can compete at the 
international level, must allow foreign capital to flood virtually all sectors of the local 
economy. 
 Of course, states might have decided to conclude investment treaties – however 
unequal in fact or in law – because they perceived other benefits of doing so (or other risks 
of not doing so). For one, as discussed, they may have believed it self-evident that the 
treaties would increase actual investment flows from the opposite state party. Or they may 
have wished to avoid punitive responses or recriminations by powerful states. Put 
differently, we might simply acknowledge that the bargaining choices of states are made in a 
political context that goes beyond consideration of markets and the movement of capital 
flows or in themselves. At a certain point, though, the treaties become less a bargain and 
more simply a capitulation by the weak to the powerful, without material consideration in 
exchange for an offer to open the host economy to foreign ownership.95 The treaties, that is, 
offer evidence that undermines the present justification of the system. Just as the unequal 
treaties of earlier periods were condemned on normative grounds,96 so too can investment 
treaties be criticized for a lack of reciprocity in the benefits they bestow. 
 
 2. Did developing and transition states appreciate the risks? 
 
This leads to the related question of whether states that have entered into investment treaties 
fully appreciated the risks of those treaties when they were concluded. Let us begin with 
developing and transition states. Does it appear that they committed the necessary resources 
and expertise in their governments to analyze the treaties in order to make careful decisions 
to conclude them? We have indications that they did not. There are reports of investment 
treaties being signed as photo opportunities at road shows by public officials.97 Pakistan’s 
former Attorney General, Makhdoom Ali Khan, has reported that there was little evidence 
in the early 2000s, when his country faced its first BIT claim, that ministries in the Pakistani 
government (beyond the one that had signed them) were aware of the country’s BITs and 
                                                 
93 Supra note 91. 
94 On the other hand, even in the case of the U.S. and Canada, significant gaps are apparent where 
sectoral exceptions included in one BIT are omitted from another BIT, particularly where the latter 
allows forum-shopping. 
95 Republic of South Africa, supra note 55. 
96 M.R. AUSLIN, NEGOTIATING WITH IMPERIALISM: THE UNEQUAL TREATIES AND THE CULTURE 
OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY (Harvard University Press 2004); D. WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL 
TREATIES: NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (Lexington Books 2005). 
97 See, for example, L. Poulsen and D. Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan’s investment-treaty program after 50 
years; an interview with the former Attorney General of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, INVESTMENT TREATY 
NEWS (16 March, 2009) (hereinafter Poulsen & Vis-Dunbar). 
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that he was unable to uncover any records demonstrating meaningful participation by 
Pakistan in the BIT negotiations.98 Since his term as Attorney General ended in 2007, he 
reported, Pakistan has continued to conclude BITs without analysis of the risks and without 
proper government resourcing. 
 Similarly, a South African government commission reported recently that:99 
 
“Prior to 1994, the RSA [Republic of South Africa] had no history of negotiating 
BITs and the risks posed by such treaties were not fully appreciated at that time. The 
Executive had not been fully apprised of all the possible consequences of BITs. 
While it was understood that the democratically elected government of the time had 
to demonstrate that the RSA was an investment friendly destination, the impact of 
BITs on future policies was not critically evaluated. As a result the Executive entered 
into agreements that were heavily stacked in favour of investors without the 
necessary safeguards to preserve flexibility in a number of critical policy areas. In 
reviewing the travaux preparatoires of the various BITs entered into at the time, it 
became apparent that the inexperience of negotiators at that time and the lack of 
knowledge about investment law in general resulted in agreements that were not in 
the long term interest of the RSA.” 
 
These are serious, indeed extraordinary, admissions for a government to make. Of course, 
two examples do not make a pattern. On the other hand, if we expect that officials and 
governments generally prefer not to admit mistakes – specifically that they were not well 
informed when they made an important and long-lasting policy decision – then it is 
reasonable to conclude that others were in a similar situation to that of Pakistan and South 
Africa at the operative periods.100 
 
 3. The role of key actors in promoting the system 
 
Besides the role of states themselves, further study is warranted on the role played by actors 
in the arbitration industry in the promotion of the system. There are a number of prominent 
individuals who work as counsel or as arbitrators in the system, who appear to have had a 
role in the negotiation of the treaties, and who are strong advocates for the system. Typically 
they are based in large international law firms although they may move in and out of 
government positions as well. Two persons who appear to have played a role in this respect 
are Jan Paulsson and Daniel M. Price. 
 Paulsson is a prominent figure in arbitration, especially in Europe. As of December 
2009 he was co-head of the arbitration and public international law departments at 
Freshfields LLP in Paris.101 He was also president of the London Court of International 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Republic of South Africa, supra note 55. 
100 One story relayed to me by a prominent counsel and arbitrator was that, when representing a 
developing state in response to the first investment treaty claim against it, he learned that the country 
in question, when it received the claim, was unable to find a copy of the treaty and so had to ask for 
one from the counsel for the claimants. That a government would have to resort to this embarrassing 
step suggests that it lacked even a basic awareness of the risks associated with the investment treaty 
regime. 
101 Freshfields, People: Jan Paulsson, available at: www.freshfields.com/people/profile/11/2654. 
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Arbitration and the World Bank Administrative Tribunal. In 1996, Dezaley and Garth 
described Paulsson as “one of the leading Paris members of the new generation” of 
professional arbitration specialists and as having “excellent connections to the major 
institutions and journals, a strong base in practice as arbitrator and lawyer, and the capital 
that comes from major publications”.102 Paulsson holds several academics titles, including 
chairs at the Universities of Dundee and Miami and a visiting professorship at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. He got his start in international arbitration in 
1975 as a new associate at the New York-based law firm Coudert Brothers, working on one 
of the Libyan oil nationalization cases.103 
 Paulsson is a prominent actor in the field of commercial and investment arbitration. 
He has served as counsel or as an arbitrator in at least 13 investment arbitrations, including 
six as the presiding arbitrator, six as the investor-appointed arbitrator, and one as the state-
appointed arbitrator.104 In the early 1990s, Paulsson advised Mexico on the negotiation of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 and he has taken responsibility for conceiving and drafting its 
mechanism on the consolidation of investor claims (NAFTA Article 1126).105 He has not 
moved in and out of government positions although he does appear on behalf of 
government at official meetings, as when he reportedly represented first the London Court 
of International Arbitration and then Bahrain in recent UNCITRAL meetings on the 
revision of its arbitration rules.106 Paulsson is also one of Bahrain’s appointees to the ICSID 
Panel of Arbitrators.107 
 An element of Paulsson’s prominence in the industry is his strong promotion of the 
investment treaty system. I shall review, in some detail, some of the advocacy positions that 
he has adopted in this respect, both in arbitration awards and in published statements. These 
are intended as examples and I do not claim to provide a fulsome sample in this respect. I 
should also note that Paulsson, as an arbitrator, has been party to decisions that were 
decided against the investor interest and in favour of states.108 Based on the available record 
of awards by tribunals on which he has sat, Paulsson does not appear to be a strongly pro-
investor (or pro-state) arbitrator relative to others who are appointed frequently under 
investment treaties. That said, Paulsson has participated in tribunals that interpreted 
investment treaties in ways that significantly expanded the scope of the system and its 
compensatory promise for investors. 
 For instance, Paulsson was the presiding arbitrator on the GAMI tribunal, which 
took the unusual step of rejecting the submissions of both the investor’s home state (the 
U.S.) and the host state (Mexico) in that case on how to resolve an issue of NAFTA 
                                                 
102 DEZALEY & GARTH, supra note 65, at 140 and 24, respectively. 
103 Id., at 24. 
104 This is based on my own collected data which is limited due to its reliance on publicly reported 
information and the continuing confidentiality in many investment arbitration cases on key facts, 
such as who has been appointed to the tribunal or even fact that a claim exists. See also supra note 22. 
105 J. Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.—FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 248 (1995) 
(hereinafter Paulsson-Arbitration Without Privity).  
106 Email to the Author from an individual who attended the relevant UNCITRAL meetings, dated 
28 December, 2009. 
107 ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators (October 2009) at 11. 
108 See, for example, Azinian (Robert) et al v United Mexican States (1 November, 1999), 14 ICSID 
REV. 538, 39 I.L.M. 537, 5 ICSID REP. 272, ¶¶ 83, 87. 
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interpretation involving claims by minority shareholders.109 Both the U.S. and Mexico 
submitted that a NAFTA claim by a U.S. company that was a minority shareholder in a 
Mexican company – which had allegedly been expropriated by Mexico – could be advanced 
under NAFTA only in relation to injuries to the minority shareholder itself and not for 
injuries to the domestic company. This was an important distinction to draw because 
allowing a minority shareholder to step into the shoes of a domestic company would 
facilitate parallel claims under NAFTA and domestic law and thus expand opportunities for 
gaming by investors of the NAFTA arbitration mechanism. The GAMI tribunal, on which 
Paulsson was the presiding arbitrator, rejected these submissions of the two states parties, in 
favour of those of the investor, thus expanding significantly the jurisdiction of arbitrators 
under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
In his published work as well, Paulsson has advocated for interpretations of 
investment treaties that favoured claimants and has criticized others that limited the risks of 
the system for states (although Paulsson has also cautioned arbitrators not to go too far in 
favour of investors lest states “take fright” and withdraw from the system110). For example, 
Paulsson commented that he found it “astonishing” that the Loewen tribunal – in the face of 
silence on the point in NAFTA – would decide that the duty to exhaust local remedies was 
not removed by NAFTA in the case of a claim that the U.S. violated NAFTA’s minimum 
standard of treatment following a decision of one of its domestic courts.111 In Paulsson’s 
words, this was tantamount to reading a requirement to exhaust local remedies “as an 
implied condition” of investor claims under NAFTA.112 To be clear, Paulsson’s position on 
this point is not without foundation, given the ambiguity of the NAFTA text. The point here 
is simply that Paulsson saw fit to criticize openly another NAFTA tribunal and to favour, 
from a position of prominence in the arbitration industry, the resolution of the issue in 
favour of claimants and in favour of an expansive approach to the system. 
 Paulsson has also spoken strongly against those who criticize the use of investment 
treaty arbitration on grounds that it restricts democratic choice, unduly dismisses the role of 
the domestic legal system, or undermines important values such as judicial independence. 
For instance, in his book, Paulsson lambasted critics in the U.S. Congress, media, and non-
governmental organizations who criticized NAFTA Chapter 11 and the power it gives to 
large companies and to arbitrators. Paulsson commented:113 
 
“The neonationalist currents seem most persuasive to those who are attracted by 
sensationalist allegations of conspiracies against the public interest, and are 
disinclined to make an effort to grasp the more complex themes of international 
rules and economic cooperation. The shrill voices will always be with us. They are an 
inevitable part of democratic debate. It would be our loss if they fell silent; they 
provide valuable occasions to articulate rational rebuttals of the extreme positions 
which underlie appeals to public prejudice.” 
 
                                                 
109 GAMI Investments, Inc v Government of the United Mexican States (15 November, 2004), 44 
I.L.M. 545, 17(2) WORLD TRADE & ARB. MATERIALS 127. 
110 Paulsson-Arbitration Without Privity, supra note 105, at 257.  
111 Paulsson-Arbitration Without Privity, supra note 105, at 240. 
112 Id. 
113 PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 231-2. 
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This was an aggressive advocacy position in defence of investment treaty arbitration. While 
calling for rational rebuttal of the system’s critics, Paulsson’s own response to critics of 
NAFTA Chapter 11 (over the course of two pages in the book) was to refer to them “shrill”, 
“neonationalist”, sensationalist, attracted to “conspiracies”, lacking in “political maturity”, 
“true believers”, “[s]ervants of their revelation”, and propagandists “who care little about the 
means of advancing their cause”.114 To be fair, Paulsson also laid out various reasoned 
replies. But it is indicative of his advocacy for the system that he adopted such strong 
language in responding to criticisms of investor-state arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
 Another prominent advocate for investment arbitration whose role I will outline 
briefly is Daniel M. Price. Price is a Washington-based lawyer and arbitrator who has held 
official positions in the U.S. government. As of December 2009, Price was senior partner for 
global issues at Sidney Austin LLP, an international law firm, where he “represents clients on 
a range of international regulatory, transactional and policy matters” while also representing 
clients “in the resolution of international disputes”.115 In the Administration of George W. 
Bush, Price held the positions of Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security 
Advisor for International Economic Affairs, where he was the senior White House official 
responsible for international economic issues, including international investment. He was 
President Bush’s personal representative to the G-8, G-20 Financial Summit, and APEC 
Forum. Earlier in his career, Price was the U.S. Trade Representative’s lead negotiator on 
investment in the NAFTA negotiations and was a legal advisor on negotiations toward a 
Uruguay Round investment agreement. During 1989-2002, he was Principal Deputy General 
Counsel of the U.S. Trade Representative, where he negotiated investment treaties with 
Eastern European and Latin American states. He appears to have gotten his start in the 
general field of investment arbitration in 1984-86, when he represented the U.S. government 
and advised U.S. businesses in arbitrations before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. More 
recently, Price served as counsel to investors in investment arbitrations against Argentina, 
India, Mexico, Pakistan and Poland, and as counsel to the governments of Turkey and Peru 
in such arbitrations.116 
Price also works as an arbitrator in the system. He was (or is) an arbitrator in at least five 
cases under investment treaties. It is probable in light of his background that Price was 
appointed in all of these cases by the claimant (investor), although this cannot be verified in 
all cases due to the lack of openness in UNCITRAL arbitrations involving the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration.117 Because ICSID arbitrations are more open, however, we know that 
Price was the investor’s appointee to the Tokios tribunal, which produced a highly pro-
investor jurisdictional decision that allowed a group of Ukrainians to bring a claim against 
their own government (under the Ukraine-Lithuania BIT) by way of a holding company in 
Lithuania.118 (In opposition to this pro-investor interpretation, the presiding arbitrator on the 
tribunal, Prosper Weil, dissented and then resigned from the tribunal.) The decision of the 
majority of the Tokios tribunal remains controversial because of the extent to which it 
                                                 
114 Id., at 232-3. 
115 Sidney Austin, Our People: Daniel M. Price, available at: 
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116 Id. 
117 In both cases where the information is publicly available, Tokios, supra note 38, and Saluka 
Investments BV (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, (Sep. 7, 2006), Price was 
appointed by the claimant. 
118 Tokios, supra note 38.  
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expanded the scope of the system in the face of ambiguity in the relevant BIT and the 
ICSID Convention. 
 Of course, actors like Price and Paulsson are not themselves responsible for the 
system; it is governments that concluded the treaties. But, to understand the decision-making 
of states, an inquiry is also warranted into how actors in the arbitration industry may have 
affected the conclusion as well as the interpretation of investment treaties. The same goes 
for organizations beyond national governments that have encouraged the conclusion of 
investment treaties. Not surprisingly, business organizations have championed the system in 
its muscular form and have reacted defensively to proposals for reform.119 It is also notable 
that the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce was given the role of appointing 
authority mainly in investment treaties of Western European (and not North American) 
capital-exporters. Considering that the ICC is itself a business organization, it is important to 
take into account its role both as advocate for the system on behalf of business and supplier 
of arbitration services, on the one hand, and as an official appointing authority under 
investment treaties, on the other. Finally, international organizations – such as UNCTAD’s 
Division on Investment, Technology, and Enterprise Development through its work 
programme on investment treaties120 – have played an important role in promoting and 
facilitating the conclusion of investment treaties.121 From the late 1990s, UNCTAD has 
organized “capacity-building seminars, regional symposia, training courses, dialogues 
between negotiators and groups of civil society on the subject”.122 Investment treaties were 
also reportedly signed en masse at UNCTAD meetings organized for developing states.123 
Since the late 1990s, UNCTAD has published an extensive working paper series that tended 
to neglect or under-state the risk of investor claims and the implications for policy space.124 
 
                                                 
119 Most recently, in the review of the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: U.S. Advisory 
Committee on International Economic Policy, Report of the Advisory Committee on International Economic 
Policy Regarding the Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Presented to: The Department of State (30 September, 
2009), Annex B, 18-27 and 30-1. 
120 P.T. Muchlinski, Attempts to Extend the Accountability of Transnational Corporations: The Role of 
UNCTAD, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-
105 (M. T. Kamminga & S. Zia-Zarifi eds., Kluwer Law International 2000)(hereinafter Muchlinski). 
121 Besides UNCTAD’s numerous publications on the topic, see e.g. World Bank, World Development 
Report 2005 – A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (New York: IBRD/ Oxford University Press 
2004), which discusses the role of investment treaties in reducing barriers to international investment 
and in contributing to investment climate improvements without mentioning the risks posed by 
investment treaty arbitration to states. 
122 R. Ricupero, “Preface” [dated December 1998] in UNCTAD, “Admission and Establishment”, 
UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements (2002). Muchlinski, supra note 
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and Enterprise Development held views on FDI that were “in marked contrast to the rest of 
UNCTAD”. Email to the author (6 December, 2009). On the closing of space for development 
policies, see UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005 (New York: UNDP, 
2005), at 133-9. 
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4. Did capital-exporting states appreciate the risks? 
 
What about the major capital-exporting states? To what extent did they understand the risks 
as well as the benefits of the expansion of their treaty networks? One may assume that there 
were at least groups of officials in Western Europe and North America (where the treaties 
were devised from the 1960s through the 1980s) who understood clearly what they were 
negotiating. Officials in the UK, for example, must have had a sophisticated understanding 
of most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment when they incorporated express language into 
some UK BITs125 that extended MFN treatment from substantive to procedural aspects of 
other BITs, given that this language anticipated the complex questions of interpretation that 
were famously resolved in favour of claimants in Maffezini126 and (especially) Siemens.127 We 
may also assume that UK officials realized the significance of provisions in the UK-Egypt 
BIT that allow for forum-shopping by investors against Egypt but that shield the UK from 
reciprocal forum-shopping by requiring Egyptian investors to have their corporate seat in 
Egypt.128 In both respects, UK officials were capable of careful refinement of their treaties to 
enhance the protection of UK investors or to insulate the UK from certain types of claims 
(although neither of these provisions, especially the latter, is reflected in all of the UK’s 
BITs). On the other hand, it may be that a sophisticated understanding on the part of some 
officials in the UK or the other capital-exporting states that negotiated the treaties was not 
shared by officials elsewhere in government, especially those responsible for the regulatory 
activities that impact on investors. 
 If any governments understood the risks posed by investment treaties to policy space 
and to principles of democratic choice or judicial independence, one may assume it was the 
governments of major states which have the expertise and resources to conduct careful 
analysis when designing and negotiating their treaties. In the case of NAFTA, this 
assumption is open to question. The experience of NAFTA Chapter 11 from the mid-1990s, 
when companies began to bring claims against the U.S. and Canada, indicated that key 
decision-makers in those countries had little understanding of the implications of investor-
state arbitration or of the important powers it assigned to arbitrators.129 After seeing the 
arbitration mechanism in operation, the NAFTA states took the significant step – in the face 
                                                 
125 E.g. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Barbados for the Promotion and Protection of Investments with Protocol  (Bridgetown, 7 April, 
1993; U.K.T.S. No. 54 (1993); entered into force 7 April. 1993), art. 3(3) (hereinafter the UK-
Barbados BIT); Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
and the Government of the Republic of Chile for the Promotion and Protection of Investments with Protocol (Santiago, 
8 January, 1996; U,K,T,S, No, 37 (1997); entered into force 21 April, 1997), art. 3(4) (hereinafter the 
UK-Chile BIT). 
126 Maffezini (Emilio Agustín) v. Kingdom of Spain (25 January, 2000), 16 ICSID REV. 212, 124 ILR 
9. 
127 Siemens AG v Argentine Republic (3 August, 2004), 44 I.L.M. 138. 
128 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (London, 11 June, 1975; U.K.T.S. No. 97 (1976); entered into force 24 February, 1976), 
art. 1(d)(ii) (hereinafter the UK-Egypt BIT). 
129 Former U.S. Congressman Abner Mikva and a member of the Loewen tribunal under NAFTA said 
of NAFTA investor-state arbitration: “If Congress had known that there was anything like this in 
NAFTA, they would never have voted for it”. A. Liptak, Nafta Tribunals Stir U.S. Worries, N.Y. 
TIMES, 18 April, 2004. 
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of opposition by many in the arbitration industry130 – of requiring openness in the arbitration 
process and of clipping the discretion of Chapter 11 arbitrators after tribunals had 
interpreted NAFTA in ways that went well beyond the submissions of the NAFTA states. 
(It remains to be seen whether a similar reaction will emerge in the major Western European 
capital-exporters if and when their governments become the subject of substantial investor 
claims.131) If the U.S. and Canada were caught off guard by aspects of NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration,132 where it was included as part of a trade agreement that was debated extensively 
in both countries,133 then how likely is it that governments with fewer resources were able to 
develop a sophisticated understanding of the risks of investment treaties that received little 
or no public attention when they were concluded?134 
 
For these reasons, on balance there is reason to doubt that governments, beyond the groups 
of officials who negotiated the treaties, tested the anticipated benefits of the treaties, 
appreciated the risks of investor-state arbitration, and carried out sophisticated cost-benefit 
analyses of their commitments to compulsory international arbitration before committing 
themselves to the treaty system. This is significant if one considers the degree to which the 
system marks a major transformation of longstanding policies of governments on the 
national and international legal framework for self-determination. Undoubtedly, more 
systematic empirical work would be required to reach confident conclusions on the historical 
situation of particular countries and particular treaties. Even so, there is significant evidence 
against the claim that the investment treaty system reflects a process of informed sovereign 
consent and thoughtful strategy on the part of states. 
 
E. Justification 5: Investment Treaties were Endorsed by the Democratic Process 
 
In some respects, the fifth justification for the system is a softer version of the claim that 
states were well-informed when they concluded their key investment treaties. It is softer in 
that it asserts that, even if top-level decision-makers in national executives and legislatures 
were not well-informed about the consequences of the treaties and of their consents to 
investment arbitration, the decisions to conclude the treaties was nevertheless understood to 
be consistent with a wider neo-liberal policy135 of the state and of the electorate. The 
objective was to withdraw government from the economy and to open the economy to 
foreign capital; investment treaties were a tool to do so.136 Elections were held and duly 
elected governments concluded the treaties. Opportunities were afforded for debate; 
dissenting views were voiced and heard. In the end, the relevant entities of the state choose 
                                                 
130 See, for example, T. Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitration and the Growth of International Economic Law, 
36 CAN. BUS. L.J. 405, 422-30 (2002); C.N. Brower, C.H. Brower II & J.K. Sharpe, The Coming Crisis 
in the Global Adjudication System, 19 ARB. INT’L 415, 434-35 (2003). 
131 See the recent claim against Germany by a Swedish energy company in response to environmental 
restrictions on a coal-fired power plant in Hamburg. S. Knauer, Vattenfall vs. Germany: Power Plant 
Battle Goes to International Arbitration, Spiegel Online (15 July, 2009), available at: 
www.spiegel.de/international/ germany/0,1518,druck-636334,00.html.  
132 Brower & Steven, supra note 60, at 194-5; Laird, supra note 60, at 224-5. 
133 PAULSSON, supra note 3, at 237-8. 
134 Poulsen & Vis-Dunbar, supra note 97. 
135 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 18, at 2. 
136 The role of BITs in the privatization program adopted in Argentina in the early 1990s is a good 
example. Collinson, supra note 29, at 13. 
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to reform their economies and, as a component of this, to join the international investment 
regime. Whether governments foresaw all of the consequences is not the test; the test is 
whether they consented according to the requirements of domestic law. Normatively, the 
treaties capture an ideological spirit of a time. Formally, they were signed and ratified and 
should be respected.137 
 This line of argument is central to the regime as both a legal construct and a 
normative project. It is central to the legal construction of the regime in that the lawyers and 
arbitrators who wield power in the system derive their authority from the treaties. States 
used the treaties to subject themselves to rigorous standards that protect investors and to 
refer investment disputes to arbitration. The treaties must be interpreted and applied in light 
of this purpose as well as their text and context. As a matter of positive law, this is 
fundamental.138 
 The weakness of this construction, however, is that the law is often silent or 
ambiguous on key matters of its meaning. These matters are left to resolution by the 
adjudicative process.139 In the case of investment treaties, there is much uncertainty about 
the meaning of many of the obligations that states assumed. Investment treaties refer to core 
concepts at a high level of generality. The treaties are also not as easily revised by their 
authors as in the case of domestic legislation.140 In turn, the treaties give arbitrators a central 
law-making role in the exercise of their discretion about what the system should do, and the 
decisions of the arbitrators are not subject to fulsome review in an independent court, 
whether domestic or international. It is only part of the story, then, for Paulsson to claim 
that “Arbitral tribunals are not to be blamed for the contents of treaties”.141 
 Arbitrators must therefore often defend their interpretive decisions not simply on 
the basis that “this is what the treaty says” but rather, “the treaty does not answer this 
question, but we decided in favour of option A rather than option B”. In many awards to 
date, “option A” has been an interpretation of a treaty that was expansive of the protections 
offered to investors and of the system’s compensatory promise for international business. As 
mentioned above, such interpretations have been adopted in some cases by tribunals even 
where the states party to the treaty (including the investor’s home state) agreed that the 
treaty called for a more restrictive interpretation. 
 Beyond the legal construction of the system, moreover, there is a basic problem with 
the claim that investments treaties reflect the democratic choices of states. This is the 
problem that the terms of most of the treaties show little respect for democratic choice. 
First, the treaties do not contain even a narrow exception for legislative decisions, subjecting 
these decisions rather to the full force of the treaty even when a legislature makes a decision 
of a general nature, when it responds to a major emergency in the country, or when its 
decision is supported by an overwhelming majority of the country’s elected representatives. 
The lack of a broad exception for general legislative measures raises doubts about the claim 
of harmony between investment treaties and democracy. 
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 In addition, investment treaties usually put time limits on the right of the states 
parties to withdraw from the treaties. That is, they do not allow future decision-makers, also 
duly elected, to revisit the state’s decision to commit to the system. It is true that some of the 
treaties allow for their cancellation by a state party on short notice – such as 6 months in the 
case of NAFTA – but most give far less opportunity for democratic reconsideration of the 
state’s decision. Typically, BITs apply for an initial period of 10 to 15 years and then roll 
over for another 10 to 15 year period. At the time of roll over, there is often only a short 
period (usually 6 months to a year) in which a state may exercise its right to withdraw from 
the treaty. Thus, many of the treaties operate like inflexible term deposits: they require the 
state to lock up its policies for a lengthy period with only occasional windows of opportunity 
to cancel the term. 
  Moreover, virtually all investment treaties maintain the obligations of the states 
parties for an extended period for foreign investors whose investments existed at the time 
the treaty was cancelled. One may of course justify such provisions on the basis that, if the 
treaties are to attract foreign investment, they must cover a period sufficient to provide 
security to the relevant investors. But, as discussed above, there are reasons to doubt 
whether the treaties actually serve this end. As such, there is a strong case for the use of 
other means, especially the conclusion of investment contracts, for a state to tailor their 
approach to foreign investment according to its wider development strategy.142 
 For these reasons, it is questionable whether the investment treaty system respects 
the basic principle that one elected government may not bind another in a way that 
fundamentally restricts the policy options of the latter.143 In  common law, this principle is 
referred to as the no-fettering rule and it is an important component of legislative 
supremacy.144 In light of this principle, those who argue that investment treaties respect 
democratic decisions must explain why the rights and privileges of investors should be 
locked in for generations, while the electorate as a whole – if it rejects the investment treaty 
system after learning how it operates – is required not only to elect a new government but to 
do so at particular periods of time when the country’s treaties are up for renewal. Even then, 
the electorate’s decision is subject to a lengthy time lag during which the treaty limitations on 
government decision-making continue to apply. It is dubious to justify as democratic a 




I have examined five justifications for an investment treaty system that has been in 
ascendance since the 1990s. The discussion focused on the position of states and other 
actors that make decisions about the system’s costs and benefits and about the values that 
are said to underlie it. The analysis  suggests that governments should exercise greater care 
when considering entry into the system or, more likely, the renewal or expansion of existing 
treaty networks, and calls for thorough examination of the options for reform. 
 The focus has been on “muscular” components of investment treaties; most states 
have subjected themselves to a treaty that contains most or all of these components. These 
components have also prompted the bulk of the concern about the system as a whole. 
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Despite this, the major capital-exporting states have shown little interest in fundamental 
reform. To the extent that this stems from justifications that were examined here, it is 
problematic. To the extent that it reflects other justifications, such as the definition by major 
states of their national interest as coincidental with the interests of international businesses, 
the system should be debated on such terms so that governments and electorates can 
respond in an informed way. Thus far, the major states’ disinterest in fundamental reform 
suggests that serious alternatives to the system are more likely to emerge on a bilateral or 
regional basis, much as the system was grown over time, and that they will evolve in contrast 
to a mainstream of investment arbitration that is staunchly resistant to change. 
 At a normative level, the widespread claims that investment treaty arbitration was 
designed to address inadequacies of domestic legal systems, and to advance the rule of law 
through the use of international adjudication, are undermined by the design of the treaties 
and by the lack of fairness and independence in the arbitration mechanism. Because they 
lack institutional safeguards of independence, investment arbitrators are vulnerable to 
inappropriate influence by private actors that have clout in the arbitration industry and by 
the states or business entities that dominate voting and appoint officials in key appointing 
authorities. The appointing authorities are central to the system because they have the power 
to decide the make-up of the tribunals, the content of the arbitration rules, and the conduct 
of the process by which awards are reviewed. 
 In the history of investment treaties, developing and transition states were presented 
with take-it-or-leave-it offers from major capital-exporters to conclude investment treaties 
that, it was said, would attract foreign investment in exchange for commitments by capital-
importing countries not to expropriate or discriminate against foreign investors. There is 
now much evidence that the promised benefit did not materialise, whereas the obligations of 
host states have emerged as wide-ranging constraints on general regulations adopted in good 
faith and on a non-discriminatory basis. Many states have faced the challenge of unexpected 
waves of claims against them on matters of economic development, financial security, 
environmental and health regulation, and so on. If reform is to come, it is likely to originate 
in these countries.145 
 One avenue for reform lies in the renegotiation or abrogation of investment treaties. 
Another lies in reform of the institutional mechanisms and, specifically, in the creation of 
alternative forums and processes for the resolution of investment disputes. It would be 
beneficial to their perceived neutrality if such alternatives were based outside of the 
conventional arbitration centres of Western Europe and North America and if they 
surpassed the current system in terms of their incorporation of institutional safeguards of 
judicial independence. However, while all states should strive for a system that is consistent 
with values of fairness independence in adjudication, it is just as critical for developing and 
transition countries to formulate appropriate strategies on the investment treaty system after 
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